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ELIMINATING CHILD MARRIAGE IN INDIA: 
A BACKDOOR APPROACH TO 
ALLEVIATING HUMAN RIGHTS 
VIOLATIONS 
Jacqueline Mercier*
CHILD MARRIAGE IN INDIA: SOCIO-LEGAL AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS DIMENSIONS. By Jaya Sagade. New York: Oxford 2005. 
Abstract: Despite its illegality, child marriage occurs throughout the In-
dian landscape. In her book, Child Marriage in India: Socio-legal and Human 
Rights Dimensions, Jaya Sagade examines the prevalence of child marriage 
among India’s various cultures and its impact on the human rights of 
young women. Sagade asserts that, notwithstanding minimal legislative ef-
forts, the Indian government has not met the obligations set forth in the 
international human rights conventions that the country has ratiªed. Sa-
gade asserts that the Indian government must not only work diligently to 
change the nation’s views on child marriage, but must also legislate more 
cohesively to prohibit the practice. This Book Review takes Sagade’s hu-
man-rights-based proposals a step further and suggests that, in a country 
reluctant to release longstanding traditions, addressing the Indian tax sys-
tem and dowry laws will provide a more practical, ªnancial incentive for 
eliminating the practice of child marriage. 
People in [India] take great pleasure in [child] marriage. . . . The 
little bit of a woman, the [child] bride, clad in red silk. Drums are 
beating and men, women and children are running in order to have 
a glimpse of that lovely face. From time to time she breaks forth into 
little ravishing smiles. She looks like a lovely doll.1
                                                                                                                      
* Staff Writer, Boston College Third World Law Journal (2005–2006). 
1 Charting Cultural Nationalism, Hindu, Aug. 19, 2001, available at www.thehindu. 
com/thehindu/2001/08/19/stories/1319017k.htm (discussing how 19th Century “cul-
tural nationalists invested the institution of child marriage with both beauty and senti-
ment”). 
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Introduction 
 Child marriage is illegal in India.2 India’s Child Marriage Re-
straint Act (CMRA) prescribes the minimum age of marriage as eight-
een years for girls and twenty-one years for boys.3 In various states in 
the United States, the minimum age of marriage is as low as thirteen 
years for girls and fourteen years for boys.4 In Nigeria, the minimum 
age of marriage is as low as nine years for both girls and boys.5 In 
some countries there is no limit on the minimum age of marriage of 
girls.6 Despite having, by statute, one of the highest minimum age re-
quirements for legal marriage, child marriage continues to be wide-
spread throughout India.7 In fact, India has one of the lowest median 
ages for brides in the world.8 Recognizing that “[c]hild marriage of 
girls is a comparatively neglected social problem in India and is sel-
dom given attention by policy makers, law interpreters, law enforce-
                                                                                                                      
2 Jaya Sagade, Child Marriage in India: Socio-legal and Human Rights Dimen-
sions, at xxiv–xxv (2005). In her book, Sagade notes that the term ‘child marriage’ should 
be understood as contradictory because “[if] marriage is a formalized relationship with 
legal standing between an individual man and woman, in which sexual relations are le-
gitimized. . . . [h]ow can a child be party to a marriage, when she is unable to understand 
the nature and consequences of it.” Id. at xxvi. Despite this contradiction, the term “child 
marriage” as used here and throughout Sagade’s book, is deªned as marriage below the 
age of eighteen years, the age of majority for civil matters as deªned in the Indian Majority 
Act, 1875. Id. at xxvi–xxvii. 
3 Id. at xxiv. 
4 Id. at xl. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at xxiv. Ghana, for example, has no deªned limit on the minimum age of a mar-
riage for girls. Id. Interestingly, the state of Arizona, while prescribing eighteen as the age 
at and after which parental consent is no longer legally required for marriage, provides no 
minimum age of marriage as long as the union is approved by the court. Ariz. Rev. Stat. 
§ 25-102(A) (LexisNexis 2005). The statute provides in pertinent part, 
[p]ersons under eighteen years of age shall not marry without the consent of 
the parent or guardian having custody of such person. Persons under sixteen 
years of age shall not marry without the consent of the parent or guardian 
having custody of that person and the approval of any superior court judge in 
the state. 
Id. 
7 Sagade, supra note 2, at 4. 
8 Id. (recognizing that the median varies depending on the age and geography of the 
surveyed group, but noting that one province, Rajasthan, with a median of 15.9 years, has 
the lowest median age of marriage among women currently aged twenty to twenty-four 
years in the country). Sagade also notes that although the Singulate Mean Age at Marriage 
has increased from 15.9 years in 1961 to 19.3 years in 1991, an average of 38.4 % of girls in 
the age group of 15–19 years get married; this percentage increased to a staggering 44.7 % 
in rural populations. Id. The data also indicate that 11.8 % of girls are married by the age 
of thirteen years and 26.1 % by the age of ªfteen years. Id. 
2006] Child Marriage in India 379 
ment machinery, and academicians,”9 Jaya Sagade, in her book Child 
Marriage in India: Socio-legal and Human Rights Dimensions, explores this 
neglect from a “holistic perspective—by examining the social, reli-
gious, cultural, and legal barriers in prohibiting the harmful practice 
of child marriage in India.”10
 Adopting a feminist approach, Sagade analyzes the social, legal 
and human rights dimensions of the problem of child marriage and 
its effect on young girls.11 The prevalence of child marriage cannot be 
fully comprehended without a discussion of both the causes for and 
consequences of the continued practice throughout the Indian land-
scape.12 Sagade thus introduces the patriarchal structure of Indian 
society, which places men in a position to deªne which resources and 
contributions are highly valued.13 With this patriarchal background, 
Sagade weaves through an analysis of the legal discourse surrounding 
child marriage in India, from incomplete legislative attempts at elimi-
nating the practice, to the judiciary’s contradictory and very technical 
approach to dealing with the practice.14 Sagade points to the numer-
ous human rights that are violated by the practice, and emphasizes 
that India, which has ratiªed several international treaties addressing 
women’s issues and children’s human rights, is under an obligation to 
ensure that its infrastructure permits the equal and humane treat-
ment of women and children.15 Sagade concludes that facets of the 
                                                                                                                      
9 Id. at xxv. 
10 Id. at xxxvii. Sagade goes on to state, 
[m]y thesis is that law must have a role in effecting social change. If it is not 
harnessed in support of progress, it obstructs attempts to redress patriarchy. 
Unless the law articulates and recognizes the rights of people, redressal of vio-
lation of human rights is difªcult. From this perspective, law must be seen as 
empowering . . . . One needs to adopt more realistic appraisal of the limitations of the 
law. The myths that presently imbue law with its apparent sanctity must be 
abandoned. I argue therefore, that along with the reforms in the existing 
laws, a movement creating a legal culture, making the active agents sensitive 
to the consequences of child marriage, and furnishing meaningful viable al-
ternatives to young girls, is required to be built up. The responsibility for this 
lies with civil society. 
Id. at xxxix (emphasis added). 
11 Id. at xiii. 
12 See Sagade, supra note 2, at 1–25. 
13 Id. at 8 (suggesting that “[t]he collective effect of patriarchy is thus to reinforce sub-
ordination of women in the name of care, protection, and welfare, and make them de-
pendent on men throughout their lives”). 
14 See id. at 35–64, 73–100. 
15 See id. at 111–26, 132–66, 175–202. Sagade emphasizes throughout her discussion 
that state parties to international human rights conventions are under a legal obligation to 
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Indian government, from the courts, to the legislature, to law en-
forcement, need to work in concert to spread awareness of the prob-
lems with child marriage and to eliminate the practice for the sake of 
the nation’s young girls.16
 While reading Sagade’s explanation of the problem and her sug-
gestions for future action, it becomes apparent that the practice of 
child marriage is deeply ingrained in Indian culture and tradition.17 
Thus, relying on the government and certain professionals18 to elimi-
nate the practice through an imposed rule, which seeks to change su-
perªcially the culture’s patriarchal perception of women, will likely face 
wide-spread and long-term opposition.19 In addition to attempts to 
change the culture’s perspective on women and girls, this Book Review 
suggests that addressing the Indian tax system and dowry laws would 
provide a more practical approach to eliminating the practice of child 
marriage.20 Utilizing ªnancial means to compliment the feminist meth-
odology that Sagade lays out could produce more immediate effects as 
the nation takes time to adjust to the feminist perspective.21
 Part I of this Book Review discusses the perspectives from which 
Sagade addresses the problem of child marriage, namely the feminist 
and human rights approach to eradicating the problem. Part I also 
discusses the causes and consequences Sagade illustrates in the ªrst 
half of her book. Part II outlines and critiques the methods of eradi-
cating child marriage that Sagade suggests the Indian government 
                                                                                                                      
not only ensure legislative conformity, but also to investigate and remedy the conduct of 
individuals and institutions that violate these human rights. Id. 
16 Id. at 208–15. 
17 See Sagade, supra note 2, at 7–14. 
18 Id. at 211. Sagade suggests that a “special responsibility could be put on certain pro-
fessionals. For instance, health professionals, law enforcement ofªcials, people’s represen-
tatives, members of the judiciary, and social workers in non-governmental organizations 
and in the local community could be trained to address the practice of child marriage 
from [the] human rights perspective.” Id. 
19 See id. at 208–17. 
20 See Luigi Bernardi & Angela Fraschini, Tax System and Tax Reforms in India 2, 13–14 
(Univ. of Pavia & Univ. of Eastern Piedmont, Working Paper No. 51, 2005) available at 
http://polis.unipmn.it/pubbl/RePEc/uca/ucapdv/fraschini51.pdf. The Indian tax system 
is a three-tiered structure made up of the union government, the state governments, and 
the urban/rural local bodies. Id. at 2. The main taxes that the union is empowered to levy 
are income tax, customs duties, excise duties, sales tax and service tax. Id. The income tax 
includes both tax deductions and tax credits similar to those established by the IRS. Id. at 
13–14. Spouses are treated separately and generally their income is not combined. Id. at 
14. 
21 See Sagade, supra note 2, at 229. Sagade concludes by recognizing that “mere pas-
sage of any law will not be able to achieve its objectives unless it is meaningfully strength-
ened by other support mechanisms.” Id. 
2006] Child Marriage in India 381 
adopt to comport with international human rights standards. Part III 
begins with a discussion of the Indian practice of dowry, a discussion 
glossed over in Sagade’s book. Part III then presents the economic 
perspective and concludes by suggesting that the government could 
use tax incentives and dowry law amendments to provide more 
efªcient relief to the plight of young girls and women in India. 
I. Deªning Sagade’s Perspectives 
 Sagade emerges from an introductory sea of demographic and 
medical statistics, and charts an investigation of the causes of cultural 
support for child marriage.22 She then investigates why the prevalence 
of child marriage has not diminished despite current legislation that 
makes contracting a child marriage a criminal offense.23 Sagade fo-
cuses on several reasons for child marriage, including the intensely 
patriarchal customs in India where the attitude towards women is that 
they are not to be left independent.24 Sagade notes that by marrying 
off young girls at an early age, their “submission and acceptance of 
the traditional gender roles” becomes almost guaranteed; the young 
bride herself becomes “the carrier of the patriarchal ideology and un-
knowingly contributes to the strengthening of patriarchy.”25
                                                                                                                      
22 Id. at 1–21. Sagade offers statistics that indicate child marriage levels in different re-
gions of India and how they have changed over time. Id. at 4–5. She also discusses the 
medical consequences young brides often face from early exposure to sexual intercourse 
and child birth. Id. at 14–21. As young brides are statistically more likely to be poverty 
stricken and lacking proper prenatal care, they are more susceptible to risks that can be 
avoided or lessened through proper pregnancy management; for example, “[g]irls below 
the age of twenty years are likely to suffer from . . . recto-vaginal ªstula (VVF), which is a 
hole between the vagina and bladder or rectum. This results in continuous involuntary 
leakage of urine or faeces . . . .” Id. at 14. Sagade also tells the story of Phulmonee, a girl 
just over eleven years old who “died because of haemorrhage from a rupture of the vagina 
caused by her husband who had forcible sexual intercourse with her.” Id. at 40–43. Though 
initially charged with murder, the court later exonerated him as Phulmonee was above ten 
years old. Id. at 40. In 1860, at the time of Phulmonee’s death, the age of consent for sex-
ual intercourse was ten years and “[s]exual intercourse without the consent or against the 
will of a woman is not rape when committed by a man with his wife” provided she was not 
below ten years of age. Id. at 38. 
23 Id. at 1–14. Persons that can be held criminally liable for contracting child marriage 
are the groom, individuals who perform or conduct the child marriage, guardians or per-
sons in charge of a minor who promote, permit, or negligently fail to prevent child mar-
riage, and persons who violate an injunction issued to prohibit a proposed child marriage. 
Id. at 48–49. The punishment for contracting a child marriage is imprisonment for three 
months and/or a ªne. Id. at 49. The CMRA is silent on whether a child marriage, once 
performed, is legally valid. Id. at 52. 
24 Id. at 8. 
25 Id. at 10. 
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 In addition, Sagade offers several economic reasons for perpetua-
tion of the practice. 26 In India, dowry is still a practiced custom where 
the parents of a girl are required to give cash gifts to the groom and 
his family; the longer the marriage arrangement is delayed, the more 
the dowry increases.27 Economics further sustain the practice of child 
marriage as it lessens the ªnancial burden of supporting daughters as 
a married girl joins the family of her husband.28 Also, because women 
are “out-marriers,” daughters are not expected to support their par-
ents in any way. 29 Thus, “it becomes a straight economic, utilitarian calcu-
lation of gains and losses in marrying daughters off young.”30 These 
economic reasons fade from Sagade’s analysis when she discusses the 
methods by which the government should legislate, implement, and 
enforce rules to eradicate the practice of child marriage.31
                                                                                                                      
26 Sagade, supra note 2, at 7–14. In addition to, but not completely isolated from the 
patriarchal and economic reasons for child marriage, Sagade offers several other causes 
for the continued practice. Id. These causes include the community’s desire for control 
over sexuality where culturally embedded concepts of virginity and chastity are often sym-
bols of honor and status. Id. at 9. With these values, concerns over purity are eased if girls 
are married at a younger age. Id. at 9–10. Sagade also points to a lack of awareness about 
the adverse health consequences and the law as reasons for the continued practice. Id. at 
12. The lack of political commitment is also discussed, where Sagade alleges that no seri-
ous efforts have been made by the Indian government to curb child marriage despite an at 
least superªcial attempt to respond to the demands of the international community. Id. at 
xxxiv, 13. 
27 See id. at 10–11. “[A]s the girl gets older . . . she needs an older bridegroom. An 
older bridegroom is likely to be more educated. And the more education the more dowry 
is an established trend. To avoid more expenditure by marrying her at a later age, parent 
prefers to marry her off at an early age.” Id.; see also Barbara R. Hauser, Born a Eunuch? 
Harmful Inheritance Practices and Human Rights, 21 Law & Ineq. 1, 32–33 (2003) (deªning 
dowry as the practice of a bride’s family giving money and property either to the bride or 
to the new family she joins; thus dowry is understood as giving the daughter her inheri-
tance at the time of marriage). 
28 Sagade, supra note 2, at 11. 
29 Id. at 11, 30 n.61. Sagade explains that “[o]ut-marriers means women leave their 
parent’s [sic] house and join the husband at his house.” Id. at 30 n.61. 
30 Id. at 11 (emphasis added). Because daughters typically become extensions of the 
bridegroom’s natal family, they cease to be members of their own natal family and thus 
daughters are spared the responsibility of supporting their parents or siblings. Id. Thus, in 
ªnancial terms, daughters are a perpetual expense and their parents can expect no future 
return on their investment. See id. 
31 See id. at 208–17. In her introduction, Sagade discusses the economic reasons that 
contribute to the continued practice of child marriage, including the practice of dowry 
and the cultural understanding that women do not contribute monetarily to the income of 
the family and are therefore burdens to be married off as soon as possible. Id. at 10–11. 
These economic reasons are not discussed in depth again in her analysis, nor are they 
mentioned in her suggestions for future action. See id. at 208–17. The only time economi-
cally based laws are discussed as needing reform is when Sagade brieºy notes that, “all 
other laws that devalue women need to be amended. For example, laws relating to inheri-
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 The tension between a sometimes progressive government and a 
people entrenched in tradition surfaces as legislative and judicial at-
tempts to curb child marriage stall at the feet of cultures and religions 
more concerned with historical customs than the dictates of an ideo-
logically distant administration.32 Sagade next uncovers several gaps 
in India’s legislation and case law, and in doing so uncovers the diver-
gence of cultural norms from governmental goals.33 While Sagade is 
quick to allege that these lacunae indicate that the Indian govern-
ment is merely “pay[ing] lip service to the cause of preventing child 
marriage,”34 she seems to have forgotten that this is a government 
seeking to create rules that conºict with the deeply imbedded patriar-
chal traditions of Indian society.35
 This conºict becomes evident as the government’s attempts to 
legislate and the judiciary’s attempts to adjudicate historically have 
been confronted with community disregard or outrage.36 Even within 
the last decade, public outrage at attempts to discourage child mar-
riage has lead to uproar and violence not just against the government, 
                                                                                                                      
tance, divorce . . . and equal opportunities for women in all spheres including political and 
economic spheres.” Id. at 90. 
32 See Celestine I. Nyamu, How Should Human Rights and Development Respond to Cultural 
Legitimization of Gender Hierarchy in Developing Countries?, 41 Harv. Int’l L.J. 381, 409–10 
(2000). 
33 See Sagade, supra note 2, at 85–89. After a detailed discussion of the anomalies in the 
CMRA and other legislation connected directly or indirectly with the question of age at 
marriage, Sagade summarizes the contradictions and lacunae as a means to understand the 
desired reforms that need to be introduced. Id. CMRA not only prescribes different mini-
mum ages for the bride and the bridegroom, but it also allows an underage marriage, once 
solemnized, to become a legal union—the marriage is merely penalized. Id. at 86. Sagade 
notes that CMRA does not address the validity of the child marriage, nor does it make pro-
vision for registration of marriages. Id. CMRA does not require free consent of the parties 
for a marriage; it further declares offenses to be cognizable only for the purpose of investi-
gation. Id. There is no provision for an ex-parte injunction to prevent the solemnization of 
child marriages. Id. Lastly, Sagade emphasizes that there are contradictions in respect of 
the age of consent between CMRA and law regarding the offense of rape under the Indian 
Penal Code. Id. The age of consent is 18 years for girls under CMRA, but only 16 years for 
consent under the Indian Penal Code. Id. at 38, 86. 
34 Id. at xxxiv. 
35 Id. at 7–11. 
36 Id. at 39, 42, 74. One example of community outrage can be seen in the events that 
gave rise to Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan. A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 3011, 3014 cited in Sagade, supra 
note 2, at 128 n.22. Vishaka was a 1997 case ªled by a volunteer organization after the rape 
of a social worker. Sagade, supra note 2, at 128 n.22. The social worker, Bhavari Devi, was 
working to create awareness about CMRA and to prevent child marriages. Id. As Sagade 
suggests, “[s]he was taught a lesson for this work. She was gang-raped by the so-called high-
caste people who did not like her intervention in their personal matters.” Id. 
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but against those working for reform.37 In light of such resistance, Sa-
gade places too much weight on the need for the government to per-
fect the black letter law preventing child marriage; even laws that on 
paper completely prevent child marriage will likely have little effect in 
a society resistant to change.38 While “one has to appreciate that the 
law has a deªnite role to play in bringing about social reforms,” the 
behavior of people might be more easily changed through laws that 
seek to do more than change the traditional perception of women.39 
For example, if India implements legislation that will provide some 
economic incentive to comply with marital laws, either by reforming 
property and dowry laws or by offering tax incentives to register mar-
riages, people will be more likely to abide by the marriage laws even if 
motivated by economics rather than women’s rights.40
 With the reasons for child marriage and the problems with the 
current law explored, Sagade investigates the barriers to prohibiting 
child marriage.41 As her title indicates, Sagade investigates the issue of 
child marriage not only from a human rights approach, but also by 
                                                                                                                      
37 See Sagade, supra note 2, at 128 n.22. 
38 Id. at 74. Sagade herself suggests, in the introduction to her legal reform argument, 
that “[n]o one can guarantee, particularly in the area of personal relations, that legislation 
will succeed in changing the behaviour of people.” Id.; cf. Rohit Barot et al, South 
Asians and the Dowry Problem 76 (Werner Menski ed., 1998) (discussing the existence 
of dowry and how “[a]ttempting to eliminate the custom exogenously rather than investi-
gating and removing its root causes is a classic case of treating the symptoms rather than 
the disease”). Despite her recognition that perfect legislation alone would be insufªcient, 
Sagade dedicates many pages to recommendations for legislative reform. See Sagade, supra 
note 2, at 52–55, 57–60, 85–91, 99–100, 138–66, 188–92, 208–10, 213–17. 
39 Id. at 74. Calling it one of the easiest and most effective methods to control child mar-
riage, Sagade suggests that making the registration of marriage compulsory would ensure 
that the minimum age condition is met. Id. She also believes that it would assure the free 
consent of the parties to the marriage. Id. Making registration compulsory in the CMRA 
would be beneªcial, but as Parliament’s legislative declaration asserts, “it is not practical in a 
vast country like India with its variety of customs, religions, and level of literacy.” Id. at 59 
(citing the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 
Declarations and Reservations, opened for signature  Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, available 
at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations-country.htm). 
40 See Deborah M. Weissman, The Human Rights Dilemma: Rethinking the Humanitarian 
Project, 35 Colum. Hum. Rts L. Rev. 259, 333–36 (2004) (discussing how human rights are 
best considered with “ideological dispositions that recognize that diverse cultures possess 
their own methods of resolution”); see also Nyamu, supra note 32, at 409 (recognizing that 
in a plural settling like India “proponents of gender equality must balance idealistic aspira-
tions with a pragmatic realization that different contexts may call for diverse sets of tools to 
challenge unequal power relations”). 
41 See Sagade, supra note 2, at 7–14, 74–92. Sagade will later use this investigation as a 
backdrop for her concluding discussion of how the Indian government should operate 
beyond mere legislation to overcome cultural hurdles. See id. 
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asking the woman question.42 These two perspectives, Sagade pur-
ports, are necessary to understand the barriers in prohibiting child 
marriage and the methodology that should be implemented to over-
come these barriers.43 Sagade suggests that the practice of child mar-
riage can be challenged from the human rights perspective because 
marriage is a state sanctioned institution and failure on the part of 
India to address the prevention of child marriages of young girls is an 
indication of social injustice.44
I. Diverging From the Practical 
 Because India has ratiªed several international conventions sup-
porting women’s rights and the prevention of child marriage, it is 
“under an obligation as a matter of international law to respect, pro-
tect, and fulªll human rights of the girls referred to [in the various 
conventions].”45 India is obligated to not only protect those rights, 
but to fulªll them.46 Sagade recognizes that internal bodies monitor-
ing India’s fulªllment of these obligations are making serious efforts 
to “bring in the gender perspective,” but she argues that “these bodies 
need to confront the practice of child marriage more seriously and 
effectively by asking the woman question.”47 The woman question is 
necessary because cultural traditions pose a signiªcant barrier to pro-
hibiting child marriage.48 Those who defend child marriage suggest 
that the practice is so ingrained in Indian culture that eradicating the 
                                                                                                                      
42 Id. at xxx. Sagade explains that, “[i]n the context of child marriage, asking the 
woman question requires an examination of the gendered conditions that facilitate or 
enable child marriage, and the laws intended to regulate it. It requires attention to the 
ways in which women’s experiences and interests have been overlooked.” Id. The woman 
question means examining shortcomings in the law in failing to consider the experiences 
and values that are more typical of women than of men. Id. The purpose of the woman 
question is not only to uncover male infused features of the law and how they operate, but 
also to approach the law with a conception of how these features might be corrected. Id. 
43 Id. at xxviii–xxx, xxxv–xxxvi. 
44 Id. at 125. Sagade argues that child marriage infringes on several human rights of 
the young bride including her autonomy in choosing a life partner. Id. Furthermore, as a 
young bride forced into the role of wife, the child’s right to an education is taken away, 
which in turn denies her the opportunity to become economically independent and af-
fects her overall well-being. Id. at 125–26. 
45 Id. at 115. 
46 Sagade, supra note 2, at 115–16. By ratifying the international conventions, India 
adopted the direct, positive duty to enact appropriate legislation and provide administra-
tive, budgetary, and economic measures for the full realization of human rights. Id. 
47 Id. at xxxvii. 
48 Id. at 140. 
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practice would be equivalent to eradicating a piece of Indian tradi-
tion.49 In reaction to such arguments, Sagade emphasizes that, 
[n]o social group has suffered greater violation of its human 
rights in the name of culture than women. A cultural expla-
nation of the gendered social practice of child marriage has 
to be challenged by asking ‘the woman question’ [because] 
[o]nly when women are kept at the centre of the discussion 
can the gender complexity of the cultural argument be ex-
posed.50
 Casting tradition aside, India is legally bound to bring its legisla-
tion and policies in line with international standards.51 Sagade lists 
the measures India would have to take to comply with the interna-
tional treaties it ratiªed,52 but India’s lack of complete compliance is 
not out of ignorance, but out of purposeful non-compliance.53 While 
                                                                                                                      
49 See Debali Mookerjea-Leonard, Disenfranchised Bodies: Jyotirmoyee Devi’s Writings on the 
Partition, Genders J. 2003, http://www.genders.org/g38/g38_leonard.html. 
50 Sagade, supra note 2, at 140. 
51 See id. at 115. 
52 Id. at 142–48, 152–59, 162–63, 165–66, 178–81, 188–92, 195–99, 201–02. Sagade dis-
cusses several international human rights treaties that India has ratiªed, including the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (the 
Women’s Convention) 1979, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989. Id. at 
111–12. Sagade emphasizes that there is a “direct positive obligation on state parties to 
enact appropriate legislation and provide administrative, budgetary, and economic meas-
ures for the full realization of human rights.” Id. at 115. 
53 Id. at 144. For example, India has ªled a declaration to an article of the Women’s 
Convention which reads: 
(i) With regard to Articles 5(a) and 16(1) of the Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the Government of the 
Republic of India declares that it shall abide by and ensure these provisions in 
conformity with its policy of non-interference in the personal affairs of any 
community without its initiative and consent. 
Id. Because marriage is a matter that falls within the purview of religion-based personal 
laws, India has excused herself from needing to eliminate discrimination based on sex, 
gender, and religion in the ªeld of personal laws. Id. Article 5(a) states that state parties 
shall take all appropriate measures: 
(a) To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, 
with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all 
other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superior-
ity of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women. 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, art. 5(a), 
opened for signature  Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, available at http://www.un.org/women 
watch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm. Article 16(1) states in pertinent part that: 
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India’s non-compliance lends support to Sagade’s earlier suggestion 
that the government’s attempts to prohibit child marriage have been 
insufªcient, it also implies that the government is aware of, but has 
not fully embraced, the woman question.54 The community and the 
government would likely be more amenable to a dialogue on how 
prohibiting child marriage will beneªt society as whole.55 Although it 
is important and necessary that India understand human rights legis-
lation under the woman question umbrella, the government’s apathy 
toward the impact of child marriage might nonetheless be more easily 
extinguished if the gender neutral question was also asked.56 Sagade 
considers only the woman question even when she discusses the ef-
fects of child marriage on the health of young women; she does not 
discuss the ªnancial impact that treating preventable ailments have 
on the national economy.57 After brieºy acknowledging that 
“[s]ociety bears a phenomenal cost by allowing the continuation of 
the practice of child marriage,”58 Sagade provides no further discus-
sion of the reduction in socio-economic advancement of women, the 
increased costs of providing non-preventative health care, or the more 
                                                                                                                      
1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimina-
tion against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations 
and in particular shall ensure [that men and women enjoy]: 
(a) The same right to enter into marriage; 
(b) The same right freely to choose a spouse and to enter into marriage only 
with their free and full consent; 
(c) The same rights and responsibilities during marriage and at its dissolu-
tion; 
 . . . . 
(g) The same personal rights as husband and wife, including the right to 
choose a family name, a profession and an occupation; 
(h) The same rights . . . in respect of the ownership, acquisition, manage-
ment, administration, enjoyment and disposition of property, whether free of 
charge or for a valuable consideration. 
Id. at art. 16(1). 
54 See Sagade, supra note 2, at 144. 
55 See id. 
56 See generally Nyamu, supra note 32, at 409–11. 
57 Sagade, supra note 2, at 14–22, 175–92. Because adolescent girls experience preg-
nancy before they are physically fully developed, they are more like to suffer from several 
conditions, including maternal mortality, severe damage to the reproductive tract, and pre-
eclampsia and eclampsia, a condition involving high blood pressure, iron deªciency ane-
mia, and convulsions. Id. at 14. 
58 Id. at 22. 
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peripheral ªnancial impacts including decreased tourism from west-
erners who view India as hostile towards women.59
 Sagade’s human rights approach further wanders from the realm 
of the practical when she discusses the strategies and future action 
that the Indian government, and the Indian people, should adopt to 
eliminate child marriage.60 Sagade suggests that national publicity 
aimed at creating awareness about international human rights juris-
prudence should be at the forefront of the nation’s aims.61 Through 
such publicity, the state can better be held accountable for its seeming 
apathy and negligence in enforcing the rights of young girls.62 While 
this suggestion seems sound and effective, Sagade goes on to assert 
that it should be the “special responsibility” of certain professionals 
including law enforcement, people’s representatives, and members of 
the judiciary.63 Has she forgotten that these are the same individuals 
that she alleges fall short when enforcing, legislating, and adjudicat-
ing against support for child marriage?64
 Sagade further involves the court in methods that may alleviate 
the problem of child marriage.  She suggests that, 
a petition could be ªled before the Supreme Court challeng-
ing the practice of child marriage. The foundation of such a 
petition could be a claim that child marriage violates various 
human rights and, therefore, needs to be stopped. The gov-
ernment could be asked to submit a time-bound action plan 
covering legal and extra-legal measures to control child mar-
riage.65
Again, Sagade is calling on the judiciary and the government, both of 
whom she has criticized for failing to act sufªciently in the past, to 
implement a plan that requires changing cultural norms and perspec-
tives on the role of women in Indian society.66
                                                                                                                      
59 See id. at 7–22 (suggesting that the societal costs are high, but that much of the costs 
are hidden because statistical information is scarce). 
60 Id. at 208–18. 
61 Id. at 211. 
62 Sagade, supra note 2, at 211. 
63 Id. 
64 See id. at xxxiv, 85–89, 208–15. 
65 Id. at 180. 
66 See id. 
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III. Adding the Pragmatic 
 Thus, Sagade succeeds in weaving a holistic perspective, but hers 
is a narrow holistic perspective, limiting its purview to the human 
rights dimension and the woman question, while ignoring the poten-
tially more practical economic aspect that might more readily succeed 
in diminishing the practice of child marriage.67 Further, Sagade’s sug-
gestions as to legal and extra-legal steps that must be taken are neces-
sary, but she focuses only on improving the means that already exist.68 
These means have thus far not succeeded in reaching the desired 
end, namely an end in which the proper legislation and enforcement 
of marriage laws buttress a reformed ideology that places women 
alongside men in all forms of discourse.69 Missing from Sagade’s dis-
cussion is any investigation into how reforming laws once-removed 
from child marriage, such as property and tax laws, might eliminate 
some of the named causes of child marriage.70
A. The Dowry System 
 If dowry practices decrease, occurrences of child marriage will 
decrease.71 Sagade recognizes the practice of dowry as a ªnancial rea-
son why child marriage is still widely practiced, yet she makes no men-
tion that the practice of dowry has been prohibited by law in India 
since 1961.72 The two problems are similar in scope and effect; much 
                                                                                                                      
67 See Nyamu, supra note 32, at 409–10. Sagade’s discussion of India’s responsibility to 
the women in its communities, and to the international arena at large is an important, 
tangible tale of the work that needs to be done by the legislature and the judiciary. See 
generally Sagade, supra note 2, at 208–20. For an interesting discussion on “critical pragma-
tism,” see Nyamu, supra note 32, at 409–410. In her article, Nyamu, a fellow at the Institute 
of Development Studies at the University of Sussex, recognizes that “proponents of gender 
equality must balance idealistic aspirations with a pragmatic realization that different con-
texts may call for diverse sets of tools to challenge unequal power relations.” Id. at 409. 
Nyamu also notes that “[h]uman rights principles embodied in constitutions and interna-
tional instruments may provide a basis for such questioning, but concrete engagement 
with the politics of culture creates a much more productive challenge.” Id. at 410. 
68 See Sagade, supra note 2, at 208–20. 
69 See generally id. See also Louise Harmon & Eileen Kaufman, Dazzling the World: A Study 
of India’s Constitutional Amendment Mandating Reservations for Women on Rural Panchayats, 19 
Berkeley Women’s L.J. 32, 43–44 (2004) (stating that efforts to legislate against child 
marriage were made even pre-Independence from Britain, and that such efforts have his-
torically had little effect). 
70 See Sagade, supra note 2, at 208–20. 
71 Id. at 10–11. 
72 The Dowry Prohibition Act, No. 28 of 1961, 21 India A.I.R. Manual 127 (5th ed. 
1989); see also Hauser, supra note 27, at 31–32. In her discussion of how the practice of 
dowry in India is a chief reason for the murdering of women in the upper caste’s families, 
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like child marriage, the practice of dowry continues despite legislative 
efforts to prohibit it.73 The Dowry Prohibition Act of 1961 makes it a 
crime to give, take, or demand dowry, punishable by prison terms and 
substantial ªnes.74 Because both the givers and takers of dowry are 
held guilty of the offense, the act works as a disincentive for the bride 
or her family to report dowry cases.75 Furthermore, it is almost impos-
sible to distinguish property or money given in dowry from a purely 
voluntary gift, thus making evidence of dowry difªcult to ascertain.76 
Also like child marriage, the practice of dowry exists as a result of In-
dia’s patriarchal structure.77
 The conundrum then is that treating either one of these ill prac-
tices will likely help to cure the other, but attempts to cure each have 
                                                                                                                      
Hauser, a practicing attorney and the Representative to the United Nations from the Un-
ion Internationale des Avocats for issues affecting women, writes: 
[t]he tradition of “dowries” has been linked with a particular kind of murder: 
“bride-burning,” where a young wife living with her husband’s family burns to 
death from an “accidental” kitchen ªre. A recent study estimates that more 
than 25,000 young married women in India die or are maimed each year 
from dowry and bride burning. 
Hauser, supra note 27, at 31–32. Himendra Thakur, in his preface to South Asians and the 
Dowry Problem, writes, “[t]he most likely cause [of bride-burning] is that the father of the 
bride has been unable to meet demands of dowry . . . which kept on increasing after the 
wedding.” Barot, supra note 38, at xiii. 
73 Barot, supra note 38, at 75. Curious is the fact that Sagade makes no suggestion that 
the legislature or law enforcement make any advances in curbing this prohibited practice. 
See Sagade, supra note 2, at 10–11, 208–20. 
74 The Dowry Prohibition Act, No.28 of 1961, §§ 3–4; India Code (1961). The penalty 
for giving, taking, or aiding in the giving or taking of dowry shall be imprisonment for no 
less than ªve years with a ªne of no less than ªfteen thousand rupees or the amount of the 
value of the dowry, whichever is more. Id. § 3. The penalty for demanding dowry shall be 
imprisonment for no less than six months but no more than two years, with a ªne that may 
not exceed ten thousand rupees. Id. § 4. The Act deªnes dowry as, 
any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or 
indirectly— 
(a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or 
(b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to ei-
ther party to the marriage or to any other person. 
Id. § 2. 
75 Barot, supra note 38, at 75. 
76 Id. at 75–76. 
77 See id. at xvi. Himendra Thakur, an engineer who serves as the Chair of the Board of 
Directors for the International Society Against Dowry and Bride-Burning in India, notes 
that the patriarchal structure of the culture creates social norms where the girl’s family is 
“mainly responsible for the ‘giving away’ of the daughter and has to bear the bulk of the 
marriage expenses.” Id. 
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thus far been unsuccessful.78 The problem of dowry and its perpetra-
tion of child marriage could be addressed in several ways that do not 
necessarily eradicate either problem, but at least introduce short term 
methods that can begin to attack the practices from within the conªnes 
of dowry and property law.79 For example, the Dowry Prohibition Act of 
1961 could be amended to make only takers (or those aiding in taking 
dowry) liable, thereby making the dowry giver exempt from punish-
ment.80 Making the giver exempt would allow for the bride or her fam-
ily to report circumstances in which dowry was demanded without fear 
of punishment themselves for being a party to the transaction.81
 The bride’s family often agrees to give dowry because they un-
derstand it as buying assurance that their daughter will be treated well 
and cared for within marriage; thus, it may be better to make dowry 
legal but highly regulated.82 If dowry, or any gift at the time of regis-
tered marriage, becomes marital property, revocable upon divorce or 
unnatural death of the bride within some deªned length of time, then 
parents of young girls would be more likely to wait until their daugh-
ters were of legal marrying age before contracting their marriage so 
as to beneªt from the protections of marital property.83 If parents, at 
the time of registering the marriage, also registered the dowry given 
to the couple, parents of the bride would feel some comfort in know-
ing that if the groom is marrying their daughter for the dowry, they 
would have some recourse if the marriage fails or if their daughter 
dies.84 Even in light of the current Dowry Prohibition Act of 1961, the 
                                                                                                                      
78 See id. at 75–76; Sagade, supra note 2, at xxxvii–xl. 
79 See Nyamu, supra note 32, at 410. 
80 Barot, supra note 38, at 219. 
81 See id. 
82 See id. 
83 See id. at 94, 219. Bisakha Sen, a researcher and Ph.D. in Economics, suggests that 
making all gifts given at the time of marriage property of the bride will ensure that the 
husband cannot beneªt from the dowry, but Sen also suggests that such a measure would 
likely lead to resistance because an unconditional transfer of the full amount of dowry to 
the bride would make it pointless from the point of view of the groom’s family to demand 
property. Id. at 94. 
84 Id. Similarly, Sen notes that, 
it would be more palatable to all if the groom’s claim over the dowry were 
recognized as being conditional on the marriage contract being upheld, the 
dowry being reverting [sic] by law to the bride or her family upon the mar-
riage contract being terminated by divorce or unnatural death. This would 
also encourage the bride’s family to document the items given in dowry 
ofªcially, and leave the groom and his family fewer reasons to protest against 
such documentation. 
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practice of dowry could fall into further disfavor if the couple them-
selves were given an incentive to register property given in dowry 
through a tax credit for jointly held property.85
B. Incentives to Register Marriage 
 One of Sagade strongest criticisms of the CMRA is its failure to 
make registration of marriage compulsory.86 She suggests that man-
dating registration would assure the fulªllment of the condition as to 
the age of the parties, as well as their free consent to the marriage.87 
Sagade suggests that the various states use the existing infrastructure 
for registering births and deaths for registering marriages. She fur-
ther suggests that, 
[a] step towards implementation could be to establish a pilot 
project for registration of marriage in one state . . . . Analysis 
could be done of the situation whether the registration of 
marriages makes any difference in reducing the number of 
child marriages. Based on that experience, the governments 
of other states could be convinced to introduce the compul-
sory registration of marriages.88
While this prototype and spread-by-example suggestion could help to 
increase the registration of marriages, especially in the more devel-
oped states and regions of the country, the government’s whole rea-
soning behind not making the registration of marriage compulsory is 
because “it is not practical in a vast country like India with its variety 
of customs [and] religions.”89 And while she does suggest methods for 
making the registration compulsory, what Sagade does not proffer is 
any suggestion on how to enforce such provisions.90 In a nation where 
the practice of child marriage is illegal yet prevalent, a provision mak-
ing registration of marriages compulsory would likely encounter simi-
lar disregard amongst various cultures.91
                                                                                                                      
Id. 
85 See Barot, supra note 38, at 94, 219. 
86 Sagade, supra note 2, at 89. 
87 Id. Sagade also emphasizes that the international treaties that India has ratiªed ob-
ligates India to make the registration of marriages compulsory. Id. at 146. 
88 Id. at 60. 
89 Id. at 59 (quoting India’s ªled declaration to Article 16(2) of the Women’s Conven-
tion which calls for adoption of a law for compulsory registration of marriages). 
90 Id. at 89. 
91 See Nyamu, supra note 32, at 410. 
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 Sagade’s socio-legal human rights approach to decreasing the 
occurrences of child marriage would thus beneªt from the introduc-
tion of a critical pragmatism into the struggle for gender equality.92 A 
pragmatic approach could co-mingle property and tax laws to create a 
means by which the beneªts of dowry are decreased and the beneªts 
of marriage registration are increased.93 Because female children are 
typically not given a share in parental property, dowry becomes the 
closest substitute for inheritance.94 While the task of ensuring that 
daughters get their due share in parental property may prove difªcult, 
if not impossible, perhaps there is a tax-based way to encourage a 
generation of wives to get their due share in nuptial property. This 
initial due share could then begin a cycle where wives, as property 
owners and mothers, would ensure their daughters receive a share in 
parental property that they then could bring to the nuptial table.95
 For example, an immediate tax credit upon registration of mar-
riage would encourage families to register in accordance with local 
laws.96 If, as part of the marriage registration, the couple also regis-
tered title in property jointly, the couple could receive tax credits on 
liabilities incurred for personal property that would be taxed at a 
higher rate if held individually.97 Such a practice would convert prop-
erty given in dowry to property jointly owned by the married couple.98 
A bride and groom, if blessed with a daughter, may not be enticed to 
marry her off at a young age to avoid an increasing dowry if they were 
                                                                                                                      
92 See id. at 409. 
93 Id. at 410–11; see also Bernardi & Fraschini, supra note 20, at 13–14. 
94 Hauser, supra note 27, at 33. 
95 See id. 
96 See generally Nyamu, supra note 32, at 410–11. 
97 Id. at 410 (recognizing that “[m]arriage, divorce and death are key events for deªn-
ing and reconstituting property rights of women and children, whose access to economic 
resources heavily depends on relationships to fathers or husbands”). Nyamu further notes 
that the lack of women’s property interests results from “contemporary perceptions of 
cultural norms” and that a pragmatic solution would “seek greater inclusiveness in the 
registration of title, by promoting joint registration of spouses and ofªcial disclosure that a 
title holder is a trustee for other socially recognized, but unregistered, property interests.” 
Id. at 411; see also Hauser, supra note 27, at 42. Methods to increase women’s equality by 
restructuring property laws have recently been proposed, including a provision in the 
Hindu Succession (Amendment) Bill 2000 that would call for equal rights for daughters in 
coparcenary property, thus granting a Hindu daughter the same property rights as a son 
and allowing for the property to be divided equally. Id. A more recently drafted amend-
ment, providing the same property rights to sons and daughters, was adopted on August 
29, 2005 as the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Bill 2005. Parliament Passes Hindu Succes-
sion and Immigration (Carriers’ Liability) Amendment Bills, 2005, OnlyPunjab.com, Aug. 29, 
2005, http://onlypunjab.com/fullstory2k5-insight-news-status-21-newsID-29136.html. 
98 See Nyamu, supra note 32, at 409–11. 
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receiving continued tax incentives from their jointly held property.99 
The daughter’s potential groom may not want to marry her at a 
young age because he will be unable to receive the marriage tax credit 
if she is below the legal age.100
 A tax incentive approach would allow individuals to choose to have 
both spouses share the same rights in the ownership, acquisition, man-
agement, administration, enjoyment, and disposition of property.101 
The Indian government thereby would be closer to complying with Ar-
ticle 16(h) of the Women’s Convention in a manner that comports with 
the government’s desire not interfere in personal matters without the 
community’s own initiative and consent.102 While perhaps overly sim-
plistic and discussed without reference to social implications, a discus-
sion of a practical, albeit backdoor, method to diminish child marriages 
should not be ignored when legislative and judicial attempts to do the 
same have been shunned by the Indian culture.103
 While it may appear that a sweeping tax incentive to restructure 
the property imbalance between men and women would be costly to 
implement, the result can be cost saving in other areas.104 As women 
become more ªnancially independent through property rights, the 
ªnancial burden the economy faces in caring for widows will be de-
creased; as fewer young girls are married off at ages unsafe for inter-
course and child-bearing, the health-care costs of caring for ailing 
adolescents will also decrease.105 Fortunately, the Indian government 
has seen an impressive strengthening in its economy and gross do-
mestic product over the last two decades, two decades that have un-
dergone considerable tax reform as well.106 Major changes have seen 
                                                                                                                      
99 See id. 
100 See id. 
101 Id. at 410–11. 
102 See Sagade, supra note 2, at 144 (discussing India’s ªled declaration to Articles 5 
and 16 of the Women’s Convention which states that the convention will be enforced only 
to the extent that it does not interfere in the personal affairs of any community “without its 
initiative and consent”)(emphasis added); supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text. 
103 Harmon & Kaufman, supra note 69, at 44 (recognizing how in the early 20th Cen-
tury, “[t]he thought of altering legal relationships within the family was seen as fundamen-
tally threatening to the most basic institutional unit in society”). Professors Harmon and 
Kaufman go on to discuss how “[d]emands for inheritance rights for daughters, or 
women’s equal rights regarding divorce, and an insistence on monogamy were viewed as 
endangering the joint family and ultimately challenging the dominant patriarchy.” Id. 
104 See id. at 40–43. 
105 Sagade, supra note 2, at 14–22; Harmon & Kaufman, supra note 69, at 40–43. 
106 Bernardi & Fraschini, supra note 20, at 3; Shankar Acharya, India’s Tax Reformers, 
rediff.com, Apr. 26, 2005, http://in.rediff.com/money/2005/apr/26guest3.htm. Statis-
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a boost in spending on primary schools and health care in the hopes 
of beneªting the ordinary citizen.107 As Sagade notes, education is 
central to any success in elevating the status of young girls and elimi-
nating child marriage.108 Spending increased revenue on education 
and decreasing taxes on spousal property will not only be offset by 
decreased expenditures on healthcare and welfare, but also by the 
increased productivity and tax paying status of educated, property-
owning women.109
 Child marriage is not the only Indian practice affecting women 
and girls that will beneªt from a restructuring of the property tax 
laws.110 Because females are culturally viewed as a ªnancial burden, 
their status as daughters and widows are considered an economic en-
cumbrance upon the parents and in-laws.111 The Indian practices of 
female infanticide and sati, though diminishing in modern times, ex-
emplify women’s inferiority; the eradication of child marriage through 
more equitable property distribution will lead to women being more 
ªnancially independent.112
Conclusion 
 In Child Marriage in India: Socio-legal and Human Rights Dimensions, 
Jaya Sagade argues that the Indian government must orchestrate a 
                                                                                                                      
tics over the past two decades indicate that total GDP grew yearly at about six percent. Ber- 
nardi & Fraschini, supra note 20, at 3. 
107 See India Unveils Anti-Poverty Budget, BBC News, Feb. 28, 2005, http://news.bbc. 
co.uk/1/hi/business/4303507.stm. 
108 Sagade, supra note 2, at 56. 
109 See id. 
110 See Harmon & Kaufman, supra note 69, at 41–42, 53. 
111 Id. 
112 See id. Sati is the custom of a wife voluntarily sacriªcing herself on her husband’s 
funeral pyre. Id. at 41. In a discussion about the perception of women as ªnancially bur-
densome, Harmon and Kaufman point to the Indian proverb that “raising a daughter is 
like watering a neighbor’s plant.” Id. at 53. Despite this seemingly light-hearted saying, they 
also note that the widespread availability of sex-selective sonograms results in an estimated 
three to ªve million abortions of female fetuses every year. Harmon & Kaufman, supra 
note 69, at 53. In addition, in Bihar, India’s poorest state, 
[m]idwives are paid ªfty cents and a sack of grain for delivering a girl, more 
than twice that amount for delivering a boy, and as much as ªve dollars for 
getting rid of a girl. . . . [I]n some parts of Bihar, each midwife killed ªve 
newborn girls each month, using techniques including snapping the baby’s 
spine, forcing rock salt down the baby’s throat, or sealing the baby in a clay 
pot. 
Id. 
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movement involving the legislature, the judiciary, law enforcement, 
educators, and the people as a whole.113 Her recommendations are 
broad and inspiring, and certainly aim to cure child marriage and its 
consequences on the health, education, and overall value of girls.114 
Sagade recognizes that legal reforms involve changing long standing 
habits and behavior of humans, and that these reforms are often in 
opposition to personal and vested interests.115 She further recognizes 
that it is not an easy task to achieve such a behavioral change merely 
through legal reforms.116 The methods that Sagade suggests in addi-
tion to the requisite legal reforms would undoubtedly change India’s 
patriarchal perspective, but these methods could encounter resis-
tance, because they, like the legal reforms themselves, involve chang-
ing long standing habits and behavior of humans.117
 In an effort to ªnd a more effective method to erase the practice 
of child marriage from India’s culture, this Book Review proposes 
several more pragmatic options. The national government, through 
tax incentives involving the registration of marriages and the property 
and inheritance laws, should create ªnancial incentives for the people 
of India to change their habits and behavior. If all parties to a mar-
riage, including the bride’s parents, will enjoy a tax beneªt and prop-
erty protection from registering marriage and dowry gifts, then the 
parties to a marriage will be more inclined to wait and marry at the 
legal, ªnancially beneªcial marrying age. Pragmatic, economically 
induced behavioral changes should be made in such a way as to com-
pliment the human rights and feminist approach that Sagade pro-
poses. The combination of the practical and the ideal will hopefully 
converge so that not only is the effect equal footing and protected hu-
man rights for women, but also that the aim is an India that exem-
pliªes an explicit commitment to gender justice.118
                                                                                                                      
113 See Sagade, supra note 2, at 221–22. 
114 See id. at 208–17. 
115 Id. at 225. 
116 Id. 
117 See Nyamu, supra note 32, at 409–10. 
118 See Harmon & Kaufman, supra note 69, at 46. 
